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INTRODUCTION
From a young age, civics and social studies classes teach children the basic
principles that the Founding Fathers established for this country-especially the
stress placed on the separation of powers. As the country evolves, the steadfastness
of checks and balances seemingly remains. There have always been questions of
whether the judicial branch is the most or least important of the three branches.
2 In
the current political climate, especially after the contentious confirmation process of
the newest Supreme Court Justice, Brett Kavanaugh,
3 one could say that the judiciary
has become the most important-or at the very least-the last to succumb to political
pressures. The judiciary as a whole has attempted to remain neutral but is in a limbo
created by many state legislatures when deciding what areas need more or fewer
judicial seats in their respective states.
4 Judicial redistricting attempts to rectify
issues of judges in specific circuits and districts working a caseload that is much
higher than others across the respective state by adding, moving, or removing
judgeships.5 Now, however, it seems the power of the judiciary is being put to the
test with states instituting redistricting measures for the judgeships.
6
To further understand why judicial redistricting is essential, it is helpful to
understand the history of redistricting in general. Redistricting is a long-standing
way to draw election maps with multiple variables that have both helped and
hindered each side of the political aisle.7 As the country grows, so do the populations
of towns and counties.' In some jurisdictions there were no shifts within the districts
of the numbers of representatives and senators.
9 In the 1960s, however, the Supreme
Court held that population disparity of this sort violated the United States
Constitution and required "equal population for each legislative district."'" The
Supreme Court was generally reluctant to rule on political questions before the ruling
in Baker v. Carr. Y This ruling established that redistricting was not a political
2 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.").
3 Alana Abramson, Brett Kavanaugh Confirmed to Supreme Court After Fight That DividedAmerica,
TIME (Oct. 7, 2018, 5:11 PM), http://time.com/5417538/bett-kavanaugh-confirmed-senate-supreme-
court/ [https://perma.cc/XFE7-6JWE] (discussing how the fate of Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation
rested with swing votes of Maine Republican Senator Susan Collins and West Virginia Democratic
Senator Joe Manchin in the midst of social issues of gender, class, and privilege).
4 J. B. Wogan, Judicial Redistricting: Issue Politicians Don't Want to Discuss,
GOVERNING (June 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-judicial-redistricting-
courts-judges.html [https://perma.cc/43UX-9AMJ].
5id.
6
id.
7 See Justin Levitt, What is Redistricting?, LOY. L. SCH.: ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/what.php [https://perma.cc/M2DU-YEZL].
8 Id.
9 See id.
0 Id.
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962); Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, Equal Population,
PUB. MAPPING PROJECT, http://www.publicmapping.org/what-is-redistricting/redistricting-criteria-equal-
population [https://perma.cc/FE75-QMM2] (discussing the courts classification of political questions, like
redistricting, as non-justiciable prior to Baker v. Car).
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question but one the Court could rule on in any circumstance.12 Because redistricting
had not happened in many states, it created a population imbalance between rural
and urban areas causing unequal representation.3 The 1964 Supreme Court decision
in Reynolds v. Sims struck down a malapportioned map requiring that an equal
number of "voters should elect an equal number of state representatives.' ' 4 Equal
population meant that the boundaries would have to be adjusted to account for the
new population growth, and thus redistricting was bom.'5 While the Reynolds case
established the equal population requirement, the Court held that "the
reapportionment decisions were not intended to apply to judicial elections."'6
Judicial redistricting is seemingly forgotten in the grand scheme of the political
arena.'7 It happens far less often than Congressional and state map redrawing-with
some states electing not to do judicial redistricting at all.'8 The judiciary is generally
considered a neutral arbiter and is known for remaining unbiased in their decisions,
based on the law rather than politics.'9 Because of the inherent separation of powers,
the judicial branch is privy to operate its own affairs, with some checks and
balances.2" Due to this, those outside the judiciary are typically not aware of what
the ramifications are if judicial seats are not accurately allocated. This Note takes a
more in-depth look at how different states have addressed the judicial redistricting
problems when it comes to overworked or underworked judges in their jurisdictions.
Further, it addresses the current problem within the Commonwealth of Kentucky
regarding its first failed legislative attempt at statewide redistricting and the
subsequent elimination of a judicial seat in the second attempt.21
Part I of this Note focuses on what judicial redistricting is and why it is vital to
the functionality of the three-branch system. It also distinguishes the difference
between congressional maps and judicial maps. Part II highlights how other states
have approached the issue ofjudicial redistricting and their remedies, or lack thereof.
Part ilI stresses the redistricting predicament that has taken place in Kentucky.
Within that, issues such as separation of powers, overbreadth and vagueness of
legislation, the weighted caseload formula itself, and the influence of partisan
politics have played a significant role in the implementation of a bill that has been
procedurally flawed from its inception. Part IV deals with the prospect of using the
bench as a new form of gerrymandering. While the courts are impartial in their
application of the law when it pertains to court cases, there is the suggestion that
12 Altman & McDonald, supra note 11.
13 Id.
14 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Barbara Luck Graham, Federal Cow
Policy-Making and Political Equality: An Analysis of Judicial Redistricting, 44 W. POL. Q.
101, 101 (1991).
15 See Levitt, supra note 7.
16 Graham, supra note 14, at 101.
I7 d. at 101-02.
18 See Wogan, supra note 4 (stating that judicial districts and circuits in Kentucky have not been
redrawn in 124 years).
"9 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2.
20 See., KY. CONST. §§ 27-28.
2' H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §1 (Ky. 2018); 2017 S.B. 9, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. §1 (Ky. 2017).
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because judges and justices can be elected or appointed officials, courts are still at
the mercy of the legislature and the partisan politics behind them. Part V focuses on
potential resolutions to the redistricting problem including a uniform case
management system, applying "one person, one vote" to judicial district maps, and
making adjustments to the current weighted caseload system. It will also consider
where to go from here regarding the future of redistricting, and more specifically
how to deal with the procedural problem arising in Kentucky.
1. THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING
Redistricting is a "legally required process that occurs every ten years."
'22 During
this process, the districts for the United States House of Representatives and state
legislatures are redrawn.2 3 The districts divide states and the people who live in the
geographical territories.24 A district may encompass the entirety of the jurisdiction
while other jurisdictions are separated into multiple districts. 
25 When multiple
districts cover one jurisdiction, there must be a way to define where the lines will be
drawn, and the purpose of redistricting is to ensure it is in an efficient and fair way.
Though the purpose of redistricting is seemingly straightforward, its history has
created a lasting negative impact that has been the source of much contention
overtime.26 Redistricting has been used for political gain even before the United
States Constitution took effect.27 For example, in 1788 former Governor of Virginia,
Patrick Henry swayed the legislature to redraw the 5th Congressional District so that
James Madison would have to run against James Monroe.
28 Although Madison
won,29 it was a testament o the power of redistricting and the political games behind
it.
Though redistricting on its face is not seemingly controversial, it has garnered a
negative reputation over time. In 1812 Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
enacted a law that defined the state's new senatorial districts. 30 The law
"consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts," which "gave
disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans."
31 Because the outline
22 Aaron Blake, Redistricting Explained, WASH. POST (June 1, 201 1),
httpsJ/www.washingtonpostcom/pobtics/redistricting-explained/2011/05/27/AGWsFNGHstory.htll?no
redirect--on&utm term-.2ecc3675acc9 [https://pennacc/7W7F-J27P].
23 Id.
24 See supra text accompanying note 7.
21 See Blake, supra note 22.
26 See Gerrymandering, or How Drawing Irregular Lines Can Impact an Election, PBS (June 20,
2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/2017/06/gerrymandering-or-how-drawing-irregular-lines-
can-impact-an-election/ [https://perma.cc/8ZAD-7WNE]; see also Gerrymandering and Partisan Politics
in the U.S., PBS (Sept. 26,2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/daily-videos/gerrymandefing-and-
partisan-politics-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6ADU-EZYZ].
27 Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2 012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrymandering-in-
american-politics/26
2 36
9 /.
28 id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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of one of the districts resembled a salamander, a cartoon was drawn combining it and
the governor's name to create what we now know as "gerrymandering." 32
Gerrymandering is typically seen as a hindrance to the electoral process because it
violates the basic principles-compactness and equality of size--of districting.33
Gerrymandering infringes on the electoral process by skewing the equal
representation of a specific district to favor one political party over another, which
is what the Supreme Court has attempted to deter with its decisions.3 4
In 1964, the Supreme Court established how districts should be drawn and how
districts should reflect substantial equality of population.35 This ruling, however, has
not truly deterred parties from using this method for political gain. After the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was passed, several states used this opportunity to draw maps
where the "majority-minority" districts encompassed a non-white majority, making
it much easier for minority voters to have the representation of their
choice-opposite of what it had been in the past.36 While this was used to protect
minority voters in places like the Deep South where there had been a history of
disenfranchisement, it still perpetuated the use of gerrymandering-albeit in an
affirmative way. 37 The "state-sanctioned" gerrymandering-as Section 5 was
referred to-required individual states to obtain pre-clearance in order for their maps
to be approved by the Department of Justice to avoid partiality for specific voting
demographics over another.38
Over time, the Supreme Court has wavered some when it comes to
gerrymandering and the types of gerrymandering that have been used historically.
While the Court is firm in its stance regarding the use of race as a predominant factor
in redrawing district lines,39 use of the safe harbor methods initially put in place to
prevent racially motivated gerrymandering-such as Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 196540-has been dismantled.41 In the dissent of Shelby County v. Holder,
Justice Ginsburg warned of a backslide once the provision was removed from states
that had a tradition of disparaging minority voters.42 Consequently, all the states that
fell under the preclearance provision of Section 5 have initially begun to implement
voter or election laws that harm already disenfranchised voters, specifically
minorities.43 Partisan gerrymandering-much like racial gerrymandering-is now
32 Barasch, supra note 27.
" See id.
14 See id.
35 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964); see also Levitt, supra note 7 (discussing the
Supreme Court holdings of the 1960s relating to redistricting).
36 Barasch, supra note 27.
37 id.
38 Id.
39 See generally Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 931-32 (1996).
40 See generally Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534-35 (2013) (discussing the effect of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on any law related to voting).
41 Id. at 557. To clarify, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has not itself been dismantled by
this case, but rather Section 4(b) that is based on ideas in Section 5 has been dismantled. Id.
42 Id. at 584-85 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 592.
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being used as a tool to disparage voters." By using partisan gerrymandering the
congressional and state maps are designed to favor one party or another-instead of
using race as a predominant factor-political affiliation is the predominant factor.
45
Additionally, the Court has also ruled that partisan gerrymandering is a political
question, making it non-justiciable.4 6
Though the process for congressional redistricting-both federally and
statewide-is well established,4 7 the process for judicial redistricting is vaguer.
Many states do not think about the redistricting of their judicial maps of the circuit
and district courts.48 For instance, the Commonwealth of Kentucky has not revised
judicial boundaries for 124 years.49 Since 1893 there have been many changes across
the Commonwealth, such as a uniform health-care mandate and Medicaid Expansion
aided by the Affordable Care Act,5" but the judicial boundaries have not been revised
statewide to address the surge in population.
51 Kentucky, however, is not the only
state to face backlash when it comes to judicial redistricting.
5
1
2 Still, it has been one
of the only states to pass "piecemeal" legislation by removing only one judgeship in
the Commonwealth after the original statewide redistricting attempt 
failed.53
Judicial redistricting is essential in the overall awareness of access to justice for
all. Access to justice allows people "to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or
informal institutions of justice for grievances in compliance with human rights
standards."54 Access to justice encourages human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all,55 and according to the United Nations, access to justice is merely a "basic
principle of the rule of law."56 Without it, those who are not as well-versed in the
law could fall prey to those who are and in the process may not be able to exercise
rights, hold their lawmakers accountable, or potentially be victims to
44 See Adam Prokop, What is Gerrymandering?, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:16 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/8/5/17991938/what-is-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/W3HA-K6X8].
45 Id.
' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing that the arguments against the courts hearing cases on judicial
redistricting are not persuasive enough to bar gerrymandering issues as non-justiciable).
47 See Levitt, supra note 7.
48 See, Wogan, supra note 4.
49 Id.
'o See kynect: Kentucky's Healthcare Connection, NASCIO 2014 STATE IT RECOGNITION AWARDS,
https://web.archive.org/web/201 803270254 10/https://www.nascio.org/portals/0/awards/nominations
2Ol
4/2014/2014KY4-Kentucky kynect 2014_%20NASCIOAwardSubmission Final.pdf-
51 See Wogan, supra note 4.
52 Id.
53 See H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY,
CERTIFICATION OF NECESSITY 31ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter CERTIFICATION OF
NECESSITY 31 ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT].
" Necessary Condition: Access to Justice, U.S. INST. PEACE [hereinafter Necessary Condition],
https://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilizatin-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/rule-
law/access-justice [https://perma.cc/HYN2-7JNM].
55 Human Rights and Access to Justice, AM. BAR ASS'N,
https:/www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule of law/what-we-do/human-rights-access-to-justice!
[https'//permacc/58TW-W83K].
56 Access to Justice, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-
justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/access-to-justice/ [https://perma.cc/V3KT-4BV2].
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discrimination.5 7 Some organizations go as far to say that access to justice is a
"necessary condition." '8 In Kentucky, the focus is on helping low- and
moderate-income individuals navigate the legal system in civil issues. " Chief
Justice John D. Minton, Jr. weighed in on the issue stating, "[w]e must work together
to resolve issues that threaten the safety, health, financial security and overall
well-being of some of our most vulnerable citizens."6 The importance of equal
justice and representation spans not only across the Commonwealth but also
worldwide.
The notion of having enough judges to handle dockets in their respective
jurisdictions should not be an afterthought, but at the forefront of creating a sense of
judicial efficiency, trust, and confidence in the legal system. A study done in
Kentucky showed that each type of case a court covers requires different processing
than other cases.6 1 Conversely, despite the need for trust and efficiency, many do not
see another option than removing judgeships for the sake of saving taxpayers'
money.62 The constant tension between needing to redraw the judicial maps versus
the effect it will have on communities is why this issue is so difficult to resolve.
Because of this, states have made incremental changes rather than a statewide
overhaul of the judiciary.63
II. STATES' ATTEMPTS AT JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING
While judicial redistricting is not an anomaly by any means, failed attempts have
created a logical question-why does it not work? While there is no clear answer to
why judicial redistricting does not fare well when there is a statewide overhaul,
looking at the judicial proposals of several states gives some indication.' Each of
these states has made robust attempts at judicial redistricting, with the results
seemingly being the same in each instance.65 To achieve judicial efficiency, politics
has pressed its way into a position and branch of government that is known for its
neutrality.66 Overall, there is steady contention with the legislatures that causes the
failure of a statewide judicial redistricting proposal. Several states have attempted to
redistrict their judgeships to combat the issue.67 Those legislatures acknowledge that
some jurisdictions are being overworked, while others are being underworked-but
57
1d.
58 See Necessary Condition, supra note 54.
59 Paul Hitchcock, Kentucky Access to Justice Commission Receives Grant to Improve Access to Civil
Justice System, WMKY (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.wmky.org/post/kentucky-access-justice-
commission-receives-grant-improve-access-civil-justice-system [https://perma.cc/62X3-JA77].
60 id.
61 See Wogan, supra note 4.
62 id.
63 id.
64 See id.
61 See id
66 See S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, JUDICIAL REDISTRICaTNG IN NORTH CAROLINA: A PLAN FOR SECOND
CLASS JuSTICE I (Mar. 20, 2018), https:/www.southemcoalition.org/vp-contentluploads/2019/02/SCSJ-Judicial-
Redistricting-Analysis-FINAL-rev.-3-20-18.pdf[httpsi/permacc/l9GQ-5CHS].
67 See Wogan, supra note 4 (discussing Montana's attempts to redistrict its courts).
2019-2020
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
there is no general compromise to remedy the problem.
68 It would appear judiciaries
have the most knowledge of how and what needs to change, but with the legislatures
controlling the purse strings, it ties the judiciary's hands, creating an inability to
make changes on their own in the interest of justice.
A. Montana
Montana has previously made many attempts at judicial redistricting.
69 The most
recent being in 2017-where the independent judicial commission agreed not to
move forward with the findings of the weighted caseload assessment.
7 ° While the
numbers of the weighted caseload assessment suggest there is a need for about 21
new judges across the state, some judges worry that there may not be any place to
put the new judges.71 This is something to take into consideration because more
judges mean more office space, and this would be a cost that the state may not be
able to incur at the time. State Representative Nate McConnell addressed the price
of adding the judges acknowledging that the cost would be high - fumding that he
believes the state will not get or appropriate.
72
Since Montana last drew its judicial districts in 1929, the state has made only
minor adjustments; there has been no statewide redistricting effort.
73 Montana has
not removed any judgeships from their districts, either.
74 Any changes made were to
add judges where needed but not to reallocate to other overworked or underworked
jurisdictions.75 Montana's weighted caseload assessment has been used for other
states as a model to assess the workload of the judges throughout various
jurisdictions.76 Nevertheless, Montana has been unable to use their method as a
comprehensive way to redraw the districts and circuits statewide.
77
The weighted caseload assessment is an efficient way to quantify the judicial
workload.78 While it can give a sense ofjurisdictional workload, it is not a foolproof
68 See id.
69 id.
70 Holly Michels, Commission: Redistricting Might Not Be the Best Fix for Judge Shortages, INDEP. REC.
(Feb. 2, 2016), https://hexenair.com/news/politics/state/commission-redistficting-migrt-not-be-best-fx-for-
judge-shortages/article fl 8be1 fe-44f4-51af-9f~c-bc8fd62773fe.html [https://perma.cc/6BGG-4L97].
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See generally RACHEL WEISS, JUDICIAL REDISTRICrlNG COMMISSION, RECENT HISTORY OF
MONTANA'S JUDICIAL DISTRICTS (2015), https://leg.mtgov/content/Committees/Interim/2015 -2016/Judicial-
Redisticting/Meetings/Sept-2015/Exhibits/jrc-district-history-september-2015-5218RWXC.pdf
[https://perma-cc/RV2E-9Y5H] (reporting all of the judicial changes in Montana since 1983, which have only
been additions).
75 See id.
76 See generally BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, KENTUCKY JUDICIAL WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT (2016),
https://courts.ky.gov/resources/publicationsresources[Publications/InterimReportJudicialWorkload
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SKA-VL6W] (explaining the process by which the judicial workload of
Kentucky judges was conducted and the results that came from the study).
" See Michels, supra note 70.
78 See JIM DILLER, WEIGHTED CASELOAD MEASURES & THE QUARTERLY STATUS
REPORT 1 (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/pubs-trial-court-weighted-
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method. Many variables are calculated, such as the difference between working a
family court case versus a civil case.79 In Montana, using the method-although the
independent commission found that there was a need for judges in certain
areas--the state could not justify moving a judgeship from another jurisdiction that
would require citizens to drive hours to get to court. 80 The legislature and
commission decided to scrape together funds to add the judgeships as not to
inconvenience their citizens.8 Although caseloads are high-by addressing the issue
at least somewhat--this will prevent even longer dockets and keep efficiency as low
as it can be.
B. Tennessee
Out of all the states, Tennessee has had one of the most challenging times in
constructing judicial realignment. In 2009, The Justice Management Institute
conducted a study to determine what needed to be done with judicial redistricting
within the state.82 The study found that states do not create specific criteria for
judicial redistricting and that there is a variation of practices in how and where cases
are heard.83 The study concluded that there needed to be an accurate way to track
workload, but because hearings were held district-wide, it was difficult to determine
workload on a county-by-county basis.84 In 2013, Speaker of the State Senate Ron
Ramsey received fourteen proposals for the judicial redistricting initiative for the
state.85 At the time the proposals were discussed, Tennessee had not redrawn their
judicial maps since 1984.86 Despite this, the Tennessee Trial Judges Association
responded to the Senate proposals with a letter concerning the cost effect of caseloads
and distanced traveled from county to county.87
caseload.pdf [https://perma.cc/L65M-BGHL] (discussing Indiana's use of the weighted caseload
study method in determining the need to judges in each district); see also Determining the
Number of Judges, DISTRICT CTS., https://www.auditor.Ieg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/0102ch3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PAJ-7H3E] (discussing Minnesota's use of the weighted caseload study method
in determining the need for judges in each district).
79 See DILLER, supra note 78.
'0 See JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 65TH
MONTANA LEGISLATURE (2016) [hereinafter MONTANA REDISTRICTING REPORT],
https ://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/Committees/interim/20 15-201 6/jrc-final-report-201 6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y5D-3BCF].
8 Id.; see also Wogan, supra note 4.
12 M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, JON GOULD & HOLLY STEVENS, THE
JUSTICE MGMT. INST., TENNESSEE JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING STUDY (2009),
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/tnjudicialredistricting study-
conclusions recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX6S-CEKJ].
83 Id.
84 Id.
" 14 Proposals Submitted for Tenn. Judicial Redistricting, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (Mar. 10, 2013),
https://www.hedcdaurier.com/newsocal/propos-subnmitted-for-tenn-judicial-redistricting/artic-e d47c5eaS-
8872-11 e2-9dOd-00 Ia4bcf6878.html [httpsJ//permacc!B8P5-UX23].
86 Id.
" See id
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Governor Haslam addressed the issues the Tennessee Trial Judges Association
raised in their letter, by signing Public Chapter 974 into law in May 2018.88 This
established a task force to evaluate the current judicial districts.
8 9 The task force has
eleven members appointed by the House and Senate Speakers, which includes an
array ofjudicial officers including current Chancellors, District Attorneys, a County
Clerk, and Public Defenders. 9 0 The task force is also responsible for creating
recommendations for a future statewide redistricting plan, with the plan published
no later than December 2019.91 The task force is holding three public hearings with
a published schedule allowing the general public to be involved in the process.
92
Only time will tell how this judicial redistricting process will shake out, but by
having members of the legal community involved there will hopefully be a practical
resolution.
C. North Carolina
North Carolina's issues with redistricting span more than just the judiciary.
93 The
state has been marred with constant litigation over their congressional maps for
years,94 so it is not a surprise their judicial maps would be any different. The General
Assembly in North Carolina has attempted judicial redistricting several times.
95
Currently, due to pending redistricting litigation of their legislative districts, there
has been a delay in making any headway on boundaries for trial judges and
prosecutors.
96
Unlike Montana, North Carolina does not have a definitive system to determine
judicial workload and has had trouble getting both chambers of their General
Assembly to agree on the issue.97 Because of this, lawmakers attempted to pass
fragments of a statewide remapping of the judicial election districts before filing for
election.9" The situation in North Carolina has boiled down to a political dispute
between the Republican and Democratic Parties.
9 9 Governor Roy Cooper and other
88 Advisory TaskForce on Composition ofJudicialDistricts, TENN. ST. CTS. [hereinafter Advisory Task Force],http://tncourts.gov/Advisory%/20Task%/2Forrce%/2Oon%/2OComposifti n%2Oo /2OJudicial /2ODistricts
[https'.penm.cd47AL,-4W95].
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See The Latest: Another Redistricting Case Slows Judicial Remap, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT
(Jan. 22, 2018) [hereinafter US NEWS & WORLD REPORT], https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/north-carol ina/articles/201 8-01-22/the- latest-another-redistricting-case-sows-judicial-remap
[https://perma.cc/JD2K-ADMU].
" Michael Wines, State Court Bars Using North Carolina House Map in 2020 Elections,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/north-carolina-gerrymander-
maps.html [https://perma.cc/BK4L-J65G].
9 See US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 93; see also S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 1.96 US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 93.
97 Mecklenburg Judicial Redistricting Bill Advances, Expands, WFAE (June 2, 2018),
http://www.wfae.org/post/mecklenburg-judicial-redistricting-bill-advances-expands#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/9BYA-RCD2].
98 Id.
99 See id.
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Democrats were opposed to the redistricting because it favors Republican
candidates, allowing the candidates to gain "more seats on the bench."" The North
Carolina Bar Association weighed in on the redistricting bill as well, suggesting that
"any redistricting of Judicial and Prosecutorial Districts should" include "input from
the Administrative Office of the Courts, [j]udges, [d]istrict [a]ttorneys, members of
the bar, and other stakeholders in the judicial system."1 °1 The North Carolina Bar
Association continued to urge for a result to increase "efficiency and access to
justice" so the citizens of North Carolina could be confident and trust its legal
system. 
102
D. Michigan
The state of Michigan has been subject to gerrymandering over several decades
as well. Starting in 1998, the state used the weighted caseload method to help allocate
funding and resources for the judiciary across the state.10 3 Over the next twelve years,
Michigan went through a series of processes to determine the best course of action
and eliminated thirty-six judgeships throughout the state."4 This was done in an
attempt to free up taxpayer money and ensure the number of judges mirrored
appropriate caseloads.1 05
While Michigan has been somewhat successful in their attempts to use the
caseload method, they are still not free from political dead-hand control. This
particular example does not fall within judicial redistricting, but it opens the curtain
to political sway on the judiciary. Michigan's newest initiative speaks only to
congressional and legislative maps, but it is the Michigan Supreme Court decision
that is the concern. In 2018, there was a push by grassroots group "Voters Not
Politicians" to remove gerrymandering from redistricting."0 6 The group initiated a
ballot proposition, which passed to create an independent redistricting commission
for future maps.107 In July 2018, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in a 4-3 decision
to add "Prop 2" on the ballot.10 8 Justice Elizabeth Clement spoke about how she went
against her party to allow the proposition on the ballot. 09 Justice Clement suggested
10'0d.
lo NCBA Opposes House Bill 717, N.C. BAR ASS'N, https://www.ncbar.org/news/ncba-opposes-
house-bill-717/ [https://perma.cc/B7SA-Z3XP].
102 Id.
103 Matthew Kleiman et al., Workload Assessment: A Data-Driven Management Tool for the Judicial
Branch, in COUNCIL OF ST. Gov'Ts, BOOK OF THE STATES 243, 245 (2013),
https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/kleiman lee ostrom 2013.pdf[https://perma.cc/8EH5-Q58S].
'04 Id. at 245-46.
'0' Id. at 245.
116 Lee DeVito, Gerrymandered No More: Michigan Approves Redistricting Reform, DETROIT METRO
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:10 AM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2018/11/06/gerrymandered-
no-more-michigan-approves-redistricting-reform [https://permannc/Y8S8-DXPB].
107 id.
108 Id.
I09 ld.
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she was intimidated by "outside forces" and shunned by the Republican Party after
the decision. 10
Justice Clement was appointed by Republican Governor Rick Snyder and was up
for election for the first time on the November ballot.
11 Clement faced "bullying and
intimidation" while the redistricting proposal was still being deliberated."
2 One
Justice saw the pressure applied to Clement as "a breach of legal protocols."
' ' 3 The
Republican Party went as far as to remove Clement's name and photo from a door
hanger that listed every other statewide Republican candidate."
4 While the issues
faced by Justice Clement are not explicitly tied to judicial redistricting, it plays into
the role of the party in an attempt to perpetuate the cycle of gerrymandering that has
been a harmful influence on the judiciary.
E. Other States
Minnesota, Florida, Nebraska, and Indiana have all used the weighted caseload
assessment to evaluate judicial workloads. None of these states, however, have used
the method to create a statewide redistricting initiative. Minnesota used its caseload
assessment to determine which cases would take longer to adjudicate."' They also
provided a list of guidelines for the Administrative Office of the Courts to follow to
create a more structured and uniform judiciary."
6 Florida established its method in
order to certify the need for adding new judges as the state grew in population'
Nebraska conducted an assessment for the 2017 calendar year to gauge their judicial
workload." 8 Nebraska's caseload assessment notes, however, that the method does
not determine an exact number of judges required for the judicial district."
9 It also
suggests that if there are less than full-time equivalent judges, additional assessment
should be conducted.120 Indiana has used the weighted caseload method since 1996
110 Id.
"'Beth LeBlanc, Michigan Justice Faced 'Bullying' Over Redistricting Plan, THE DETROIT NEWS
(Sept. 24,2018, 11:58 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/09/24/justice-
clement-bullying-redistricting-proposal/1412350002/ [https://perma.cc/5J33-W4G2].
112 Id. (discussing how certain Republicans would not speak to Clement, nor would they endorse her
with the other primary candidates because she did not fall within party lines on the issue of redistricting).
113 id.
114 Id.
1'
5 
See OFFICE OF THE LEG. AUDITOR, PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT: DISTRICT COURTS 37-47 (2001)
[hereinafter MINNESOTA CASELOAD DATA], https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/
0100 8 6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NN7M-422K].
11
6 id. at 44.
117 OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION BRIEF ON
WEIGHTED CASELOAD METHODS OF ASSESSING JUDICIAL WORKLOAD AND CERTIFYING THE NEED FOR
ADDITIONAL JUDGES 1 (1998) http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/976
7
rpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8S8-K83J].
"' NEB. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, WEIGHTED CASELOAD REPORT: DISTRICT COURTS (2017)
[hereinafter NEBRASKA CASELOAD REPORT], https://supremecourt.nebraska~gov/sites/default/files/CY-
2017-district-weighted-caseload-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HTF-AMCQ].
19 Id.
121 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 8-9.
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and evaluates their resources thoroughly every six to seven years.21 Indiana also
publishes a "Temporary Adjusted Weighted Caseload Report" which accounts for
certain variables the courts may face throughout the year.1 22
While the weighted caseload method is not a bad idea on its own, it is clear that
it requires years of proposals and work to make sure judgeships are not added or
removed hastily. Many states work for years to create plans that will be successful
for the state, the judges, staff, and most importantly, their citizens.
Kentucky conducted one study and based an entire statewide allocation on
preliminary data.123 Generally, when there is preliminary data involved during this
process, quality adjustments are recommended.124 It is suggested that those quality
adjustments are made by a panel of experienced judges with input from other judges
and focus groups.12 By jumping the gun on the redistricting process, the Kentucky
General Assembly has strained an already embattled judiciary.
m1. JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING ISSUE IN KENTUCKY
In the Commonwealth of Kentucky, no case law precedent or statute establishes
how judicial maps should be approached and appropriated. Presently, there hav6
been additions of several Circuit Family courts while the legislature removed one
Circuit judgeship statewide.26 Though the "one person, one vote" '127 principle does
not apply to judicial maps,2 8 the same idea can be used to understand the underlying
ramifications of this removal.
During the 2014 regular session of the Kentucky General Assembly, the
legislature proposed a directive to the judiciary. 121 That directive called for a
recommended realignment plan for the circuit and district courts statewide.3 ° It
reads as follows:
Realignment of Circuit and District Judicial Boundaries: The
Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and implement a
weighted caseload system to precisely measure and compare judicial
caseloads throughout the Commonwealth on the Circuit Court, Family
Court, and District Court levels for the purpose of recommending a plan
for the realignment of the circuit and district judicial boundaries. This plan
121 Weighted Caseload Measures, IND. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3330.htm
[https://perma.cc/5DAW-EX75].
122 Id.
123 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 6.
121 See Kleiman et al., supra note 103, at 244.
125 Id.
126 H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 7, 11 (Ky. 2018).
127 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause
requires the seats in a bicameral state legislature to be apportioned on a population basis that equally weighs
one vote for every one person residing in a state legislative district); see also Tennant v. Jefferson Cty.
Comm'n, 567 U.S. 758, 758 (2012); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Co., 377 U.S. 713, 741 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting).
128 See Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga 1964); see also Graham, supra note 14, at 101.
129 See H.B. 238, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § I (Ky. 2014).
130 Id.
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shall be submitted to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees by
January 15, 2016."'
Chief Justice John D. Minton, Jr. explained that the redistricting would not
impact every county or jurisdiction and would not accomplish the goal of a statewide
Family Court.3 2 The purported reasoning of the Judicial Redistricting Plan was to
allocate resources from underworked jurisdictions to those that are overworked.
133
The 2017 proposal of the Kentucky General Assembly would have at most resulted
in a lost judge seat for 15 of the 120 counties; Boyd County specifically would have
lost two judges but would have also gained a family court judge.1
34 The removal of
so few circuit judgeships would not equate to the financial solution needed for the
additional positions, making their proposal detrimental to the welfare of the
Commonwealth. Taxpayers' money is now being spent in jurisdictions that have
shown there is no need for the number ofjudges they have, and that money could be
allocated to the jurisdictions that need it the most. "I If the General Assembly
intended to maximize efficiency in the judiciary by reallocating judgeships to
overworked areas from underworked jurisdictions, how did this plan fail? Naturally,
because political capital is worth more than a fully functional judicial branch.
The Kentucky Constitution gives the General Assembly power "to reduce,
rearrange, or increase the judicial districts" upon the certification of necessity by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky.'36 What this Amendment does not do is allow the
General Assembly to impose directives to the Judiciary to make changes.'
37 The
judicial branch of the Kentucky state government has exclusive authority to manage
its administrative affairs.'3 8 A "legislative function cannot be so exercised as to
interfere unreasonably with the functioning of the courts, and that any
unconstitutional intrusion is per se unreasonable." 139 Although the General
Assembly "has a legitimate and necessary right to know" how judiciary funds are
being spent, "the authority for and responsibility of determining the necessity and
propriety of' the expenditures-from that source-rest exclusively with the judicial
branch itself'4 0 Therefore, the right of the General Assembly is to fund the judiciary,
but not to impose their legislative directives upon the other branches of Kentucky
government.'
41
The General Assembly's inability to pass the bill without proper procedure has
potentially usurped and hindered the constitutional power of the judiciary making
131 Id.
132 Update on Judicial Redistricting for the Trial Courts of Kentucky: Testimony Before the Interim
Joint Committee on State Government 3 (Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Minton Testimony] (statement of
Chief Justice John D. Minton, Jr., Kentucky Supreme Court).
133 Id. at 4.
134 Wogan, supra note 4.
135 id.
136 KY. CONST. § 112.
137 See id.
138 See id. § 110.
"' Exparte Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Ky. 1980).
'4o Id. at 685.
141 See KY. CONST. § 59 (listing the limits of the General Assembly's reach on governmental affairs).
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the bill as published unconstitutional.142 In February 2017, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky issued a certification of necessity to realign judicial circuits and districts
and reallocation of existing judgeships statewide.143 The certification of necessity
allows other branches to exercise power of another-in this instance-it grants
permission from the judiciary to the General Assembly to adjust judicial seats as
needed.'" Procedurally and substantively, the certification follows the Kentucky
constitutional provisions-which provides the General Assembly can increase or
rearrange judicial districts upon a certification of necessity from the Kentucky
Supreme Court. "45 Still, the statewide redistricting bill presented to the General
Assembly was killed because it failed to pass out of a House committee, rendering
the certification of the statewide redistricting null and void. 146 The General
Assembly introduced a new bill, HB 348, in 2018, which significantly reduces the
changes that were initially proposed in the prior statewide redistricting bill, SB 9.147
Almost all of the jurisdictions in danger of losing a judgeship were spared except for
one.14 8 HB 348 was signed into law on April 2, 2018, but without a certification of
necessity before the introduction of the bill. 149 Because the certificate of necessity
was not entered until June 7, 2018-after HB 348 was already a law--the General
Assembly failed to comply with the Kentucky Constitution making the law's
changes to KRS 23A and 24A unconstitutional.50
In November 2013, before the directive to redistrict the judgeships across the
Commonwealth, Chief Justice Minton testified to the Budget Review Subcommittee
on Justice and Judiciary.'5 ' During this testimony, there was no mention of the need
for judicial redistricting, but rather the opposite.'52 Minton's recommendation to the
judicial budget-which he has full authority to restructure by way of the Kentucky
Constitution'5 3- was authorization to gradually increase judicial salaries over the
next several years to bring the compensation of judges in line with surrounding
states.54 In light of recent findings from the State Auditor, Mike Harmon, it appears
142 See infra Part IV.
143 SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY, CERTIFICATION OF NECESSITY REALIGNMENT OF JUDICIAL
CIRCUITS AND DISTRICTS AND REALLOCATION OF EXISTING JUDGESHIPS 1 (Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter
CERTIFICATION OF NECESSITY REALLOCATION].
14' KY. CONST. § 112.
146 Kentucky Senate Bill 9, LEGISCAN, https:/legiscan.com/KY/bill/SB9/2017 [https://pernacc/LUK2-DZJL].
147 See H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); see also S.B. 9, 2017 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017).
148 See H.B. 348, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (taking the total number ofjudgeships in Floyd
County from 3 to 2).
149 Kentucky House Bill 348, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/KY/bilVHB348/2018 [https//pera.cc!CLQ9-
TAW8].
"' CERTIFICATION OF NECESSITY 31ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, supra note 53; see also KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21A.350, 23A.040, 23A.045, 23A.050, 24A.030, 23A.050 (LexisNexis 2019).
151 Judicial Branch Budget Overview for FY 2014-2016: Testimony before the Budget Review
Subcommittee on Justice and the Judiciary 1 (Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Minton Budget Testimony]
(statement of Chief Justice John D. Minton, Jr., Kentucky Supreme Court).
152 See id. at 3.
153 KY. CONST. § 110.
"' Minton Budget Testimony, supra note 151, at 3.
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that the judiciary could have facilitated the judicial need and not eliminated any
judgeships if funds had been managed and appropriated accordingly.'
55 During the
self-imposed audit of the Administrative Office of the Courts, it was found that there
were two million dollars in inventory errors, documentation for credit card expenses
was missing, and some taxable benefits were not adequately reported.
56 House Bill
380 mirrors Harmon's suggestions of monetary expenditures in the judicial
branch;'57 though it may not solve the problem, managing the funds more succinctly
could open the door to adding more judgeships and appropriating funds accordingly.
The Kentucky judiciary created an independent committee to evaluate a weighted
caseload model to determine the workloads of judges across the Commonwealth.
158
Nonetheless, the weighted caseload formula used to determine the time spent in some
instances is flawed. The weighted caseload model of workload analysis only takes
into consideration three elements in determining the caseload of each court: (1) The
number of case filings opened each year; (2) "[c]ase weights", the average amount
of time required to handle each case by the judge; and (3) "[t]he year value" of the
amount of time each judge or staff member has casework for one year.
59 According
to the formula, a total "annual workload is calculated by multiplying the annual
filings for each case type by the corresponding case weight," summing that workload
across all case types, then dividing by the year value.
160 Conversely, this data is
determined on a "four-week period" and does not account for the ebb and flow that
courts can experience at times during the year.
161 It also does not consider caseload
increases or decreases for the following years.
162 This report assumes that the amount
of time judges spend on certain types of cases for the selected case study period is
the same at all times and gives no deference to potential changes.' 
63 The case weight
used to determine the numbers is also considered preliminary,
164 and case weights
could vary depending upon the year in which the study is being 
conducted.165
Therefore, the data is based upon relative numbers rather than absolute quantitative
methods. Because the numbers are not absolute it gives rise to fluctuation throughout
the year; depending on the complexity of a case, a judge may be required to spend
155 See Mike Harmon, House Bill Will Improve Accountability to Judicial Branch, KY. TODAY (Feb. 18,
2019, 7:57 AM), http://kentuckytoday.com/stories/house-bill-will-improve-accountabiity-t-ansparency-and-
bring-oversight-to-judicial-branch,1781
8 [https://perna.cc/2X5W-XYLM]; see also, MIKE HARMON,
EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS, INTERNAL CONTROLS, AND POLICIES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (July 12, 2018),
http//apps.auditor.ky.gov/Public/AuditReports/Archive/2018 AOCExamReportpdf [https://permacc/3NXE-
G9XR].
156 HARMON, EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS, supra note 155, at 11 12, 53.
157 Harmon, House Bill, supra note 155.
158 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 1.
159 Id. at 2.
160Id.
161 Id. at 3.
162 See id. at 5.
163 See id. at 6.
164 id
165 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE, CIRCurr COURT CASELOAD BY CIRCUIT
(2019) [hereinafter AOCY REPORT], httpJ/kycourts.gov/aovstatisticaeporDocuments1NSOI1CLR-pdf
[https//pemiaccIB9WH-3K5H] (listing the statistics derived from case management database for the Kentucky
Court of Justice, including the amount and type of cases heard by each circuit).
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more time on one case than another. This in turn would mean the numbers taken
during the specified time are not an accurate depiction ofjudicial time management.
An area of concern during the study submitted to the Kentucky Administrative
Office of the Courts (hereinafter, "AOC") is the varying ways Circuit Court Clerks
count the cases that are filed. In one instance, two women were charged with
seventy-two felony charges and those counts were added as seventy-two separate
cases. 166 The counts alone were misdemeanors, but once aggregated they were
elevated to felony counts.167 Typically, all counts are listed under one felony case
number-rather than seventy-two felony cases.168 The disparities showcase how
Circuit Court Clerks are keeping their records statewide; there is no way to assess
what the actual caseload of the judges is accurately. Until there is a uniform way to
manage how clerks tally the cases, judicial caseloads will vary significantly with
inaccurate numbers of case filings.
The language used within the judicial workload assessment remains ambiguous
as well. Though the purpose of the judicial workload assessment is to calculate the
accuracy of judicial caseloads across the state,1 69 it leaves much to be disputed.
Throughout the assessment, he caseload averages for each county are formulated to
"implied judicial need."'17 The word implied raises a flag that the findings are not a
complete and concrete way of determining the actual workload of circuit and district
judges. The assessment only considers a limited amount of time, and if completed
within another month of the year could ascertain different results.7 ' Until there is an
assessment that documents an entire year, minute-by-minute, there may be no
entirely accurate way to quantify judicial need, and the needs of every county will
seemingly be "implied."
When the case weights of the original assessment are compared to the current
year, there is already a spike in caseload.'72 In 2011, the number of cases filed in the
Commonwealth exceeded 114,000 cases; then there was a general decline
statewide.'73 Since, a visible upward trend in cases filed has appeared recently.'74
2015 saw a general increase of cases filed across the Commonwealth by almost
10,000 total cases.75 In a recent article President of the Senate, Robert Stivers, says
"the legislature has got to reckon with recent demographic changes in the state,
starting with the significant loss of jobs-and residents-in Eastern Kentucky.
'There's been an outmigration for the past several years, so the caseload has dropped.
166 An Act Relating to Judicial Districts and Circuits: Hearing on H.B. 348 Before H. Judiciary
Comm., 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (statement of Thomas
M. Smith, Judge, 31st Judicial Circuit), https://www.ket.org/legislature/archives/?nola=WGAOS+019179
[https://perma.cc/E858-PJE2].
167 id.
168 id.
169 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 1; see also Minton Testimony, supra note 132, at 3.
170 
Kentucky Judicial Redistricting Plan, KY. Cr. JuiCE, htpkts .gov/Pages/judiciahdistricting.aspx
[https://permacc/8QLA-U6AV]; see also OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 2.
17] See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 3.
172 See AOCY REPORT, supra note 165.
173 id.
174 Id.
175 id.
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That's just the reality."" 76 While jobs have decreased over the last decade, the
caseload in individual counties in Eastern Kentucky has increased, as noted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts reports.'
77
By having timely reviews of caseloads, stressed courts can find ways to lift
backlog.178 An assessment after eight years is too long to wait to reassess once seeing
the surge in cases that have taken place the last three years.
179 For example, "the
independent workload study showed a reduced need for the district and circuit court
judges in Boyd County" and was slated to lose a seat in the original bill.
18° State
Senator Robin Webb, a trial attorney herself, stated that "[i]t's hard to quantify the
workload of a judge ... [i]t's not an exact science."'' Boyd County is not affected
in the final bill, but it is an indication that the workload of the judiciary cannot be
quantified in a definitive measurement.'8
2 Though the Supreme Court has stated that
every ten years is enough for legislative maps,'
83 judicial maps should be reassessed
more often because they encompass more variables than population alone. As the
caseload method illustrates, many states take into account multiple things when
evaluating how, if, and when to prepare for judicial redistricting. 1' Judicial
redistricting is also different because crime, cases, and funding are continually
shifting and stability is necessary to have an efficient judiciary and access to equal
justice for the people the courts serve. As crime increases-such as per the rampant
opioid epidemic in Kentucky--more cases come before the court, and having more
cases creates backlog.'85 If there are not enough judges to handle those increasing
caseloads they take longer to resolve.86 Judiciaries also have to worry about funding,
because the state legislatures control their appropriations and at any point, their
budgets can be reduced or increased. 187
The Interim Report of the Kentucky Judicial Workload Assessment cites to
Montana law on the workload assessment using the "weighted caseload" and
"clerical weighted workload" models.'88 The state of Montana has contemplated
several proposals to address the issue of judicial redistricting similar to that in the
state of Kentucky. 89 In Montana, there have been six proposals to address the issue,
176 See Wogan, supra note 4.
'77 See AOCY REPORT, supra note 165; see also Jason Bailey, Kentucky's Economic Performance
Falls Short of Claims Based on Corporate Announcements, KY. CTR. FOR ECON. POL'Y (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://kypolicy.org/kentuccys-economic-performance-falls-short-of-claims-based-on-corporate-
announcements/ [https://perma.cc/4KG2-MHK3].
178 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 1.
179 See AOCY REPORT, supra note 165 (outlining the varying change in case filings over the course
of seven years).
80 Wogan, supra note 4.
181 Id.
182 See id.
183 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) (discussing how often legislative
districts should be readjusted).
114 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 16.
18 See AOCY REPORT, supra note 165; see also The Heroin-Fentanyl Epidemic, OFF. DRUG
CONTROL POL'Y, https://odcp.ky.gov/Pages/The-Heroin-Epidemic.aspx [https:/perma.cc/G5PB-38HD].
186 See Wogan, supra note 4.
187 See HARMON, EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS, supra note 155, at 9.
188 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 17, n. 10.
189 MONTANA REDISTRICTING REPORT, supra note 80, at 1.
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and all have been voted down for various reasons. 190 The Montana Judicial
Redistricting Commission, after considering the effects on people living in the
affected counties and on the judges' caseloads and travel times, contends that the
adjustments are "not necessary" or are they "the appropriate way to address" the
issue.1 9' An eight-year reassessment of the judicial workload is too long to wait to
determine whether to add or subtract a judgeship.
Upon evaluation, the legislation itself potentially violates the overbreadth &
vagueness statute in the Kentucky Constitution. "In reviewing the standard for
vagueness," the Kentucky Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court:
have followed two general principles . . . [A] statute is impermissibly
vague if [(1)] it does not place someone to whom it applies on actual
notice as to what conduct is prohibited; and... [(2)] if it is written in a
manner that encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.192
In the case of judicial redistricting, the language of the HB 348 is written in such a
way that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'93 The bill allows
for the General Assembly-at their discretion-to determine which judgeships are
needed and those that are not, regardless of what the workload assessments how.194
Once the Supreme Court of Kentucky has certified the necessity of judicial
redistricting, the legislature can effectively substitute a bill nullifying the numbers
from the workload assessment and tailor the bill to suit the needs of individual
counties.'
95
IV. PARTISAN POLITICS AFFECTING THE JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING PROCESS
In Kentucky, partisan politics has continued to rear its ugly head by not only
crippling the legislative process but by overextending its hand by interfering with the
judiciary. The General Assembly and Administrative Office of the Courts created a
workload assessment in an attempt to alleviate the judicial workload crisis.19 6 After
the House let a judicial redistricting bill passed by the Senate die in committee,
circuits that stood to lose judgeships were spared. 1 This form of politics goes
against the principle of the workload assessment because it negates the purpose of
having a statewide redistricting bill. In essence, there is no actual need for a workload
assessment if the General Assembly will not follow it. It seems counterintuitive to
not implement the changes found in the weighted caseload assessment since the
legislature urged the judiciary to work towards a statewide redistricting measure in
190 Id. at 5.
191 Id.
192 State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Howard, 834 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Ky. 1992)
(citations omitted).
'9' See H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018).
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76.
197 See Wogan, supra note 4.
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2014.198 The General Assembly, however, would attribute the incremental addition
and removal of judgeships to what could be passed across both houses, '99
because-at this point-something is better than nothing.
The reasoning for the workload assessment was to shift resources to the circuit
and district courts that needed it the most, however, the districts and circuits that
were flagged as having less than 1.4 workloads and 2 or more judges are not having
those positions removed by the General Assembly."' Many judges across the state
express discouragement in the length of time it takes to close a case, and this should
be addressed especially in those counties with high workloads 
per judge. 201
Removing judges from areas where the caseload is steadily increasing with the rise
in opioid and other drug use does not solve the problem. For example, Floyd County
is the only county that is having a circuit judge position eliminated without
reallocation.20 2 The workload assessment shows that the Floyd County family court
only needs one judge; however, it does not consider that Floyd County's family court
judge also presides over Knott and Magoffm counties.
203 Combining the "implied"
judicial need for those three counties places the judicial workload at 1.71, which
would suggest the workload of two judges rather than one.
2° By that measure, to
balance that workload, retaining the three circuit positions in Floyd County is
necessary to comply with the workload assessment. Because the assessment has the
numbers delegated to the proposed counties rather than the original counties those
cases belong to, it creates a misrepresentation of how much work judges in their
current counties are accumulating.
20 5
The Kentucky Constitution states that the General Assembly shall not pass local
or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following
purposes:
First: To regulate the jurisdiction, or the practice, or the circuits of the
courts of justice, or the rights, powers, duties or compensation of the
officers thereof; but the practice in circuit courts in continuous session
may, by a general law, be made different from the practice of circuit courts
held in terms.20
6
198 Id.; see also OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76.
'99 See Wogan, supra note 4.
200 See H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TFIE COURTS,
PROPOSED KENTUCKY JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR 2022 BASED ON RESULTS OF THE JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT REPORT (2016) [hereinafter PROPOSED KENTUCKY REDISTRICTING PLAN],
https//courts ky.gov/Documents/JudicialRedistricting/KYJudicia]RedistictingPlan.Pdf. [https://pe
n nmacclY983-
VRQN]; see also OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76.
20' See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 9-11.
202 Judicial Redistricting Bill Goes to Governor, LANE REP. (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.lanereport.com/88443/
20 18/03/judicial-redistricting-bill-goes-to-governmor-
2/
[https://perma.cc/VM8A-MT5K].
203 See PROPOSED KENTUCKY REDISTRICTING PLAN, supra note 200; Floyd, Knott, and Magoffin
Family Court, KY. CT. JUSTICE, https://kycourts.gov/courts/familycourt/Pages/FloydKnottMagoffinaspx
[https://perma.cc/33VJ-X7UN].
204 PROPOSED KENTUCKY REDISTRICTING PLAN, supra note 200.
205 See id.
206 KY. CONST. § 59.
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Specifically, the purpose of this section is to prevent special privileges "to bar
favoritism and discrimination and insure equality under law."2 7 There is no doubt
that need for a Judicial Redistricting Plan in the Commonwealth of Kentucky
is high, but the proper procedures must be met to comply with the Kentucky
Constitution-which is not the case with this bill.2" 8 Without accurate tracking of
cases filed, and full-length documentation of judicial workload, rather than a
selected period, there will continue to be inaccuracies within "implied" judicial need
statewide. Further, elimination, as set out in the second certificate of necessity, of
one circuit position statewide will not provide the resources needed to fund other
positions being added. If the Legislature were taking the initiative to implement their
statewide redistricting plan, then more than one jurisdiction would have been
affected by the removal, and that is not the case.
By failing to pass a comprehensive statewide judicial redistricting bill, the
General Assembly did not honestly and earnestly address the issue they proposed in
their directive to the judiciary. Many of the districts and circuits that were spared
should have been among those that had judgeships removed, but for political
influence, statewide redistricting would have passed. Chief Justice Minton stated that
he was a "reluctant participant" and, being an elected official himself, realized that
this process could affect his future on the court.20 9 He continued by commenting,
"[n]o community wants to be told it's got to give up a judgeship. There are going to
be some who gain and some who lose."21 While that was seemingly going to be the
case with a statewide redistricting plan, it turned out less ideal. This is not the first
time the General Assembly has masked their agenda behind a different bill.2 11
Though it is not related to judicial redistricting, in 2018 the General Assembly passed
a pension reform bill under the guise of a sewage bill. 212 Both Franklin Circuit Court
and the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled the bill unconstitutional because it failed
to meet the procedural requirements to pass a bill. 2 3 As of the 2019 session, the
General Assembly attempted to pass a bill that would circumvent the existing judicial
process by giving all state government defendants in civil cases the option to have
any judge across the Commonwealth, sitting in a different circuit than where the case
was originally filed, randomly assigned to hear the case.214 This comes after several
207 Dep't of Finance v. Dishman, 183 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Ky. 1944).
208 See KY. CONST. § 112, cl. 2-3; id. § 113, cl. 2-3; H.B. 348, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2018); CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY REALLOCATION, supra note 143.
209 See Wogan, supra note 4.
210 Id.
211 See Tom Loftus, Kentucky Supreme Court Strikes Down Pension Reform Law, COURIER J. (Dec.
14, 2018, 9:51 AM), https://www.courierjdournal.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/13/kentucky-supreme-
court-strikes-down-pension-reform-law/I 839742002/ [https://perma.cc/29L4-EY7V].
212 id.
213 ld.
2 14 See S.B. 2, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § I (Ky. 2019); Ryland Barton, Bill Allowing Ky. Officials to
Change Where They Get Sued Advances, 89.3 WFPL (Feb. 25, 2019), https://wfpl.org/bill-allowing-kentucky-
officials-to-change-where-they-get-sued-advances/ [https://perma.cc/FRJ8 -URZ8]; Deborah Yetter,
Controversial Bill to Let State Officials Avoid Judge Shepherd is 'on Life Support', COURIER J. (Mar. 12, 2019,
12:39 PM), https://www.courier-joumal.com/story/news/poitics/ky-legislature/2019/03/12/bill-allow-state-
employees-avoid-judge-phillip-shepherd-unlikely-pass/3138622002/ [https:J/perma-cc/QG7Y-SWAA]. While
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laws have been deemed unconstitutional by the Franklin County Circuit Court, and
some lawmakers feel this is a slight towards the governor and the Republican
Party.15 The blatant misuse of political power from the Kentucky General Assembly
to influence decisions of another branch of government goes against the very fabric
the Constitution was based upon.
V. REMEDIES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There is no one size fits all remedy for judicial redistricting. Due to the nature of
jurisdiction-specific issues, any solution would need further exploration to
determine what would be most effective while limiting detrimental effects to the
judgeships. Though, some potential solutions could be to create a uniform caseload
management system, applying the "one person, one vote" principle to judicial maps,
or tweak the current judicial weighted caseload method. While none of these would
create a definitive solution, adopting one could have an impact on a more balanced
judiciary without the interference of other branches.
The first potential solution would be for the General Assembly to implement
uniform case data for court clerks across the Commonwealth. Because of case filing
discrepancies from county to county, having a uniform system to label cases would
eliminate inflated dockets and accurately depict judicial workload. Although the
Administrative Office of the Courts has a court system that tracks cases, it is up to
the individual court clerks to input each case and any documents that belong within
them.2" 6 Different counties count cases in different ways. For instance, one county
adds each misdemeanor count collectively as multiple felony cases, while Floyd
County aggregates the misdemeanor offenses that meet felony standards and
consider it one felony case.2 17 This would typically not interfere with the judicial
process if each misdemeanor-taken individually-had become a case within the
District Court instead of Circuit Court.
218 This happened during the time the
weighted caseload study was conducted skewing the numbers, with one county filing
more cases in Circuit Court rather than District Court.
219
Creating training for court clerks to understand when to aggregate misdemeanors
into felonies would help the number of cases being placed on dockets be more
uniform-and courts could gauge their caseloads more effectively. The
Administrative Office of the Courts could also step in and give each county a set of
guidelines to follow as they process and input the cases. The guidelines would be
outlined for all courts-District, Circuit and Family-detailing which cases fall
where. Because these cases are input by the clerks there can be some human error,
this issue is beyond the overall scope of this Note, it is a microcosm of the power overreach the Kentucky General
Assembly has within the judiciary.
215 See Yetter, supra note 214.
216 See Kentcky eFiling: Frequenly Asked Questions and Tips to Improve Your Filings, KY. BAR ASS'N (June
12, 2019), https'//cdn.ymaws.comwww.kybar.org/resource/resmgr/
2019convenfion/materials/kentucky efiling_-
_frequentt.pdf [httpsJ/penna-cc/AL7F-YE9L]; see also KYeCourts (Courtnet and eFiling), KY. BAR ASs'N,
https://www.kybar.org/page/CourtNeteFiling [https://perma-cc!397A-4L94].
27 Smith Testimony, supra note 166.
218 See id.
29 See Kentucky Workload Assessment, supra note 114; see also Smith Testimony, supra note 163.
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and if the cases were filed in the wrong place, the guidelines would aid in fixing it
quickly if a problem arose. Circuit Court Clerks are also elected officials and keeping
cases organized should be of high priority, and by keeping the regimented
organization of the cases, it would help.
Another remedy would be the implementation of the "one person, one vote"
principle. As noted, judicial maps do not follow the "one person, one vote" standard,
but no Supreme Court cases say that it is impermissible.220 In Kentucky, the judges
are elected, and it is possible to create judicial boundaries based on the population of
each county or district.221 One drawback to this would be how to place the judges
based on the population appropriately. Densely populated urban areas such as
Lexington and Louisville would have more judges, but depending on judicial
boundaries the travel distance would be higher in the rural communities. Even within
counties, current drive time is upwards of forty minutes from some places to the
courthouses.222 Though it is an option, using this method may not be the most
effective for the problem at hand. Caseloads can increase quicker than populations
and could put a county with a higher incarceration rate at a disadvantage by having
fewer people. Allowing this would go against the initiative for access to equal justice,
but it is an option, nonetheless.
Lastly, a final resolution is to tweak the current process and utilize the
recommendations of the council. Although this would take the most time, by
developing a sound plan it would have the most significant impact overall. The
weighted caseload method has been proven to be a great preliminary measure for
determining judicial need.23 Other states, however, have shown that it should not be
the only factor in determining judicial need.2 4 Fixing the current method and
adopting other studies to create a comprehensive redistricting plan could lessen the
political tensions created by 1-113 348. Further, by establishing either a non-partisan
or bi-partisan independent redistricting commission to conduct the studies and make
the necessary recommendations would ensure judgeships are apportioned correctly.
The Kentucky Supreme Court would still provide a certification of necessity to
allow the General Assembly permission to move forward with the commission.
Kentucky could create a task force like Tennessee that encompasses many judicial
officers that would all be affected in the process to work with the commission.225
The aim of the independent redistricting commission is not only to be free from the
political sway but also to safeguard judgeships from being removed without just
220 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (discussing the viability of the "one
person, one vote" standard in judicial mapping).
221 See Judicial Selection in the States: Kentucky, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/index.cfm?state=KY [https://perma.cc/JX35-ZGSB].
222 See Directions from Phelps, KY to Pike County Judicial Center, GOOGLE MAPS, maps.google.com
(Search Google Maps: Phelps, Kentucky; then Directions from Pike County Judicial Center) (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JAP3-EX621.
223 See Harmon, House Bill, supra note 155 (articulating the importance of task forces in determining
the need ofjudicial offices).
224 See Matthew Kleiman et al., Case Weighting as a Common Yardstick: A Comparative Review of
Current Uses and Future Directions, 7 OgATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 640, 649-50 (2017).225 See generally Advisory Task Force, supra note 88 (discussing the effectiveness of a commissioned
task force for determining judicial workload needs).
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cause. This would help to eliminate piecemeal judgeship removals due to political
vendetta.
Keeping-but tweaking-the current weighted caseload method would be the
most comprehensive way to determine the judicial workload. First, conduct the
caseload time study throughout an entire year. Doing this accounts for all cases being
heard, not just a sample. This also shows fluctuation of certain months where
caseloads are higher than others. Other states-like Nebraska-already follow the
caseload method in this fashion and have had success .
2 6 Additionally, special judge
cases should count towards the county the judge is from and not the county they are
serving. Having judges from other jurisdictions serve as special judges takes away
from their county and would not accurately depict the time they are putting into other
cases. In the preliminary caseload study, special judge cases were not counted at
all.127 Judges who have to travel lose the time to work in their jurisdiction when they
would otherwise be in their chambers. Adding that variable to the caseload method
would also help with accuracy.
Tweaking the current caseload method, conducting more than one study, and
creating an independent redistricting commission to oversee the process would make
it much easier to develop a sound redistricting plan. Though all of these potential
remedies have their flaws, there is no one way to resolve this issue altogether. For
most states, it takes years to come to any compromise as to how to begin the
process.228 It is not something that should be done with haste, as there are many
implications with redistricting judicial seats.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a reason why judicial redistricting has rarely been touched nationwide.
States cannot come to a consensus on how the judgeships should be apportioned and
reconcile what the effects of removal would be. Both elected and appointed judges
are not beyond the sway of political influence. A study by The Brennan Center for
Justice showed that judges and justices are currently elected
in twenty-one states, are appointed in twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia, and appointed by the legislature in two other states.
2 29 Though the
judiciary has earned the moniker of "neutral arbiter" they can become beholden to
the electors that helped vote them into office or appointed them. In Kentucky, even
though a third party handled the workload assessment, it was not up to them to
determine which districts and circuits were affected by the legislation. So, what good
is a workload assessment for redistricting purposes if it is not going to be followed?
226 See NEB. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS., NEBRASKA JUDICIAL
BRANCH ANNUAL CASELOAD REPORT: COUNTY COURTS (2019),
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/sites/default/files/County-CaseloadReport FY_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52RB-6M2V].
227 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 76, at 4.
221 See supra notes 4, 80, 82, 101, 103 and accompanying text.
229 See Testimony before North Carolina Senate Select Committee on Judicial Reform and Reditricting
Judicial Selection in the States and Optionsfor Reform (Dec. 6,2017) (statement of Alicia Bannon, Senior Counsel,
Brennan Center for Justice), https//www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/senate
2Ol7-156/12-06-
17/Brennan%20tesfimony/o2ONC%/
2 0 l 2 .5.17-final.pdf [https'//permacc/AC8W-5QJA].
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Why propose a statewide redistricting bill with no intention of passing it? Though
some states have flat out refused to accept a redistricting map unless there is a
statewide mapping, others are left to the mercy of the legislature and their control of
the purse strings.
With Kentucky not being able to come to a statewide agreement on the bill and
procedurally mismanaging the second proposal there should not have been any final
legislation passed that would alter the current judgeships. Because the bill has been
signed into law, it would take a temporary injunction to keep it from going into effect
in 2023,230 or a resolution in the General Assembly to repeal it. It is unlikely that
many-if any-members of the General Assembly outside of the newly elected
Junior State Representative Ashley Tackett Lafferty and State Senator Johnny Ray
Turner for Floyd County would raise the issue because the other judgeships are
safe.231 Now, however, if there were to be a challenge to the constitutionality of the
bill, it would need to happen sooner rather than later. Historically, when dealing with
congressional and state legislative maps, the more election cycles pass the weaker
the argument of harm becomes.
This, however, is not just an issue for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As noted
above, plays for power in the state legislatures of several states reveal how much
influence there is within the judiciary. If there is indeed the need for a separation of
powers the line is becoming more and more blurred. In the current political climate
there is a distrust between politicians and their constituents, and with the legislature's
hand in the judiciary, it will only grow.
230 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23A.010 (LexisNexis 2019).
231 See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Representative Ashley Tackett
Laferty (D), KY. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://legislature.ky.gov/Legislators/Pages/Legislator-
Profile.aspx?DistrictNumber-95 [https://perma.cc/V8EY-BER7]; Senator Johnny Ray
Turner (D), KY. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://Iegislature.ky.gov/Legislators/Pages/Legislator-
Profile.aspx?DistrictNumber-129 [https://perma.cc/X27D-LFB2].
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